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Credit without banks: the Amsterdam water
bailiff’s ledger of 
DAAN VERWAAIJ and CHRISTIAAN VAN BOCHOVE
Radboud University
Before banks rose to dominate credit markets, ordinary people raised credit themselves or through
alternative intermediaries. However, obtaining a comprehensive overview of the size and functioning
of the non-bank segments within the credit market has been a great challenge for historians. Notarial
deeds are widely available, but typically shed light on the borrowing of relatively well-to-do members
of society. Probate inventories and insolvency records do provide insight into the modest loans of
ordinary people, but only haphazardly and not for the overall stock of loans. This article exploits an
exogenous shock, the Discipline Act introduced in the Netherlands in , which forced lenders to
record all unredeemed loans they had provided to a particular group of borrowers: seafarers. The
c., loans that were recorded, in combination with several additional sources, provide a unique
insight into the overall size, composition and functioning of a particular segment of the non-bank
credit market.
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JEL classification: N, N, N, N
I
Credit fulfils an important role in society as it allows people to use future revenues to
purchase goods and services in the present. Banks play a major role in bringing
together demand and supply on present-day credit markets, but prior to World
War II they only served a small, elite clientele. This did not mean, though, that
credit markets and financial intermediation for ordinary people were absent or under-
developed. In the footsteps of Muldrew, for instance, it has now been well established
that people could accomplish quite a lot themselves (Muldrew ; Finn ;
Ogilvie, Kükpker and Maegraith ; Fontaine ; Van Bochove and Kole
). Inspired by the work of Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, it has likewise
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become clear that alternative intermediaries were available when necessary (Hoffman,
Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal ; Levy ; Van Bochove and Van Velzen ).
However, obtaining a comprehensive overview of the size and functioning of the
non-bank segments of the credit market has been a great challenge for historians.
They have therefore often turned to notarial archives as these have frequently been
preserved fairly completely, but processing notarial deeds is very labour intensive.1
A further disadvantage of notarial deeds is that they only provide information
about new loans granted to relatively well-to-do members of society. Probate inven-
tories and insolvency records, on the other hand, do provide insight into the modest
loans of ordinary people, but only haphazardly and not for the overall stock of loans
(Willems ; Van Bochove and Kole ). It consequently remains unclear how
large the non-bank credit markets for ordinary people actually were.
This article exploits an exogenous shock, a law introduced in the Netherlands in
 (the Discipline Act or Tuchtwet), which forced lenders to record all unredeemed
loans they had provided to a particular group of borrowers: seafarers.2 Seafarers were
an important group around the globe: they were numerous;3 they provided a vital
contribution to trade and hence the economy; and as wages were only paid after a
journey they were always in need of credit. The Discipline Act forbade lenders
from collecting the wages of seafarers as redemption payments, as borrowers had
until then allowed them to do. The Act also stipulated that all unredeemed loans
had to be registered in a government ledger. As unregistered loans would become
void, this incentivised lenders to record all unredeemed loans. This article uses the
ledger from the city of Amsterdam, which at around this time was one of the three
largest ports in Europe (Aerts , p. ),4 to provide a unique snapshot of the
1 Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal  could only carry out their groundbreaking work because
they were able to rely on registers that summarised their notarial deeds. This did not apply to other parts
of Europe, so that comprehensive work there had to rely on sample years. See Gelderblom, Hup and
Jonker ; Lorenzini .
2 ‘Wet van den den mei , houdende bepalingen omtrent de huishouding en tucht op de koop-
vaardijschepen’ (Staatsblad van het Koningrijk der Nederlanden ); Amsterdam City Archive, Archief
van de Waterschout (entry no. ) (henceforth ACA, Waterschout), inv. no. .
3 Whilst the available sources show that an average of , ships left the Amsterdam port each year
between  and , they do not provide a breakdown of these departures by destination.
However, with manning ratios of ,  and  on destinations within Europa, Africa and the West
Indies, and the East Indies respectively, this most likely meant that , to , seafarers departed
annually from Amsterdam. This is quite a considerable number given that Amsterdam was home to
about , people at the time. See Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, -, pp. , ;
–, pp. , ; –, pp. , ; –, pp. , ; –, pp. , ;
Algemeen Handelsblad,  August ; Statistisch Jaarboek der Gemeente Amsterdam II, p. ; Van
Leeuwen and Oeppen , p. ; Van Lottum , p. .
4 The Amsterdam ledger seems to be the only one that has survived. For the northern provinces (i.e.
Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe and Overijssel) this is based on data kindly provided by Dr Jur
Leinenga (p.c.). For the western provinces (i.e. Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Zeeland) this is
based on the online archival inventories.
DAAN VERWAAI J AND CHRIST IAAN VAN BOCHOVE
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 14 Jul 2020 at 09:44:37, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
overall size and composition of a particular segment of the non-bank credit market.5
Using address books, seafarers’ original IOUs, newspaper advertisements, petitions,
minutes of parliamentary meetings and the population register, this article also pro-
vides deeper insight into the functioning of this part of the credit market. The com-
bination of all sources, moreover, makes it possible to estimate the total number of
new loans provided annually during the period –.
These sources demonstrate that lenders provided , to , new loans each
year between  and . In July , at the time that the -page ledger
was assembled, a total of , small and medium-sized loans were fully or partially
unredeemed. Together they amounted to a sum of around , guilders, or almost
, monthly wages of a sailor.6 A substantial part of this was provided by a rela-
tively small group of specialised shopkeepers and boarding-house keepers, the infam-
ous crimps of the sailor-town literature.While their vital role as providers of credit has
been recognised in prior literature, little is actually known about their credit opera-
tions (Hugill ; Bruijn , ; Fingard , ; Dixon ; Muldrew
; Finn ; Gamber ; Van Rossum ; Landheer ; Fontaine ;
Van Bochove ; Milne ; Morris and Cozens ; Hell ). The literature
that focused on the shopping landscape and the products that shopkeepers sold also
paid little attention to the credit that shopkeepers provided in the process of selling
their goods (Lesger ; Furnée and Lesger ). Moreover, the literature that
focused on consumer credit primarily looked at the innovations introduced during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (such as instalment credit, check trading
and the credit card) rather than on the use of shop credit. Those publications that
did focus on shop credit did not have data with a sufficient amount of detail as
compared to what is available for mid-nineteenth-century Amsterdam.7 This
article thus contributes not only to the literature on non-bank credit markets, but
also to the literature on shopkeepers and boarding-house keepers and their role as a
source of credit.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the credit market for seafarers
and the Discipline Act. It also discusses the ledger in which all unredeemed loans were
registered. Section III then analyses the unredeemed loans recorded in this ledger.
Section IV zooms in on the lenders and Section V focuses on one individual, Cas
5 This article hence also contributes to the literature on Amsterdam’s financial market, which primarily
focuses on theworld of high finance and the credit provided by banks to their small, elite clientele. See,
for instance, Jonker .
6 Muster rolls from the years – (Van Bochove, Van Lottum and Mourits ) and –, 
(ACA, Waterschout, inv. no. ) demonstrate that during the period prior to the Discipline Act the
default wage for a sailor was  guilders.
7 For consumer credit, see Olney ; Gelpi and Julien-Labruyère ; O’Connell ; Albert ;
Easterly , . For (the continued use of) shop credit, see Johnson ; Kent ; Olney ;
Willems ; Laferté, Avanza, Fontaine and Penissat ; Logemann and Spiekermann ;
Logemann ; Lluch .
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Spijker: the most important lender found in the ledger. Section VI extrapolates from
Spijker to the overall market and SectioN VII summarises and concludes.
I I
During the two decades prior to  some , to , ships departed from the
port of Amsterdam each year.8 Many of the seafarers who sailed on these ships
depended on credit to pay for board and lodging, to purchase shipping gear, and to
buy goods for personal and household use as well as for private trade. Already
during the early modern period seafarers in the Netherlands had discovered that
they could use their future wages for obtaining that credit. By allowing the party
responsible for the monitoring of their wage payments to withhold specified sums
of money and to use these to make redemption payments to their lenders (and to
record those on the IOUs), seafarers managed to effectively secure their loans. Amuni-
cipal official who was present when seafarers were mustered and discharged, the so-
called water bailiff (waterschout), was responsible for performing this task. The archival
sources demonstrate that this official supported a lively credit market for seafarers (Van
Bochove ; Van Bochove, Van Lottum and Mourits ; Blakemore ).9
The Discipline Act changed all this, however, as it prohibited the water bailiff
henceforth from serving the interests of borrowers and lenders. The Act was intro-
duced by the Dutch parliament in  to address an issue unrelated to credit
markets: the increasing desertion of seafarers on Dutch ships, who were lured away
in foreign ports by wages that were driven up by the gold rushes in California and
Australia.10 To give captains and shipping companies more instruments to combat
desertion and counteract its costs, lawmakers deemed it necessary to abolish the
common practice of making wage payments to lenders (article ). By no longer
making these redemption payments, direct wage payments to seafarers would increase
and this would enable captains and shipping companies to recoup a larger part of the
costs of hiring more expensive crews abroad. Although the draft Act was intended to
cover all loans, major lenders from Amsterdam and Rotterdam – through the
common practice of petitioning parliament – as well as members of parliament
insisted that changing the law without transitional arrangements would be unreason-
able. TheMinister of Justice agreed with them and the final Act therefore exempted as
yet unredeemed loans. This only applied, however, when lenders registered these
loans before a set date in a ledger with the local water bailiff. This not only provided
8 Van Bochove , n. ; Algemeen Handelsblad,  August .
9 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the cashiers of the Dutch East India Company carried
out this task for those sailing to Asia. See Van Bochove and Van Velzen .
10 Those who lobbied in favour of the Discipline Act did not intend to take over lending from shop-
keepers and boarding-house keepers. Van Bochove  showed, moreover, that even after the intro-
duction of the Discipline Act, lending to seafarers continued to be dominated by these traditional
lenders.
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a good solution to the antedating of loans, but as unregistered loans became void it
also ensured that lenders had good reason to use the ledger (Bik and Roos ;
Schuman ).11
The Discipline Act prescribed that lenders had to present their unredeemed IOUs
to the water bailiffs during the month of July . In Amsterdam, the water bailiff’s
officewas located in the Schreierstoren in the middle of one of the seafarers’ quarters and
it was open for registering IOUs six days per week. On one occasion, clerks even
worked overtime on a Sunday; presumably because the company of H. Lond, one
of the largest lenders in town, had delivered its , unredeemed IOUs the day
before and they did not want to start the new week with such a backlog. For every
single IOU the clerks recorded basic information: the date on which it was entered
into the ledger, the names of lender and borrower, the date of the (last repayment
on the) loan and the unredeemed amount. Thus, the ledger did not contain the ori-
ginal IOUs, did not include information on borrowers’ nationalities and destinations,
and did not make a distinction between loans on which repayments had and had not
been made. The clerks typically entered lenders’ IOUs consecutively during a single
day, but there existed two exceptions to this. First, a few lenders appeared on more
than one day, but the first of their appearances was numerically always most important
by far. This suggests that lenders typically managed their accounts well, but that a few
IOUs were sometimes misplaced (but recovered just in time to be registered in the
ledger). Second, in a few instances the loans recorded by one lender were interspersed
with some loans of another lender. This suggests that lenders either presented loans on
behalf of others or that they had purchased such loans on the secondary market.12
The wide variety of lenders and the large number of loans they presented for regis-
tration in the ledger confirm that the incentive to register was indeed strong. The
ledger not only contains large lenders, but also many small and medium-sized ones
who made the effort to register just one (n = ) or only a handful of IOUs rather
than write them off. The ledger likewise contains active lenders (i.e.  persons
who presented IOUs ‘dated’ ) as well as inactive ones (i.e.  persons with
IOUs ‘dated’  or earlier). The background of lenders, moreover, was diverse:
the ledger not only included shopkeepers and boarding-house keepers (see below),
but also three ship’s captains, seven shipping companies, an unmarried woman and
 widows.
11 For theHouse of Representatives, seeHandelingen der Tweede Kamer,  (November),  (, 
May; , – June;  September; October; November; , December) and  (, , –,
 February; , , March; , , –April;  September). For the Senate, seeHandelingen der Eerste
Kamer,  ( April; ,  May). ‘Wet van den den mei , houdende bepalingen omtrent de
huishouding en tucht op de koopvaardijschepen’ (Staatsblad van het Koningrijk der Nederlanden );
‘Circulaire van denMinister van Justitie van den stenMei , no. , nopens de rigtige uitvoer-
ing der wet, houdende bepalingen omtrent de huishouding en tucht op de koopvaardijschepen’
(Bijvoegsel tot het Staatsblad van het Koningrijk der Nederlanden ). See also the brochure (Van
Hasselt ) and dissertation (Van der Leeuw ) that were published about the Discipline Act.
12 For the transfer of an IOU, see ACA, Waterschout, inv. no.  (scan ).
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The water bailiff’s ledger is thus a rich source, but before proceeding to the analysis
it needs to be considered whether lenders withheld credit and pushed for repayments
once lawmakers started debating the Discipline Act. There are several reasons for
believing this was not the case. Advertisements and reports in newspapers show, for
instance, that lenders in Rotterdam and Amsterdam united and protested against
the Discipline Act rather late. While parliamentary debate took off in May ,
these lenders only gathered on  February and  March  respectively and
decided, in line with the centuries-old Dutch tradition of submitting petitions to law-
makers, to petition parliament. It is worth noting that shopkeepers and boarding-
house keepers petitioned many months after the captains (December  to
February ) as well as the Chambers of Commerce (May and June ), who
both primarily focused on the Act’s articles unrelated to credit.13 That lenders put
the Discipline Act high on their agendas relatively late suggests that they had either
been unaware of the ongoing parliamentary debates or that they expected lawmakers
to develop a transitional arrangement after being petitioned with reasonable argu-
ments. Regardless of which was the case, lending strategies would not or only very
briefly have been adjusted because the Minister of Justice already sympathised with
the petitioners in parliament on  April.14 The  ledger thus provides an encom-
passing overview of the credit market for seafarers as it existed when the Discipline Act
became effective.15
I I I
During the month of July  a group of  lenders presented , IOUs,
amounting to around , guilders, for registration in the water bailiff’s ledger.
IOUs that survived in the estates of deceased seafarers, which were settled by the
water bailiff, show that these were handwritten contracts as well as pre-printed
forms. Large lenders typically relied on forms that also pre-printed their names and
smaller lenders used forms to which they added their names by hand.16 At least
13 For the newspapers, see Algemeen Handelsblad,  February , March , March  and 
March ; De Tijd,  February ; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant,  March ; Utrechtsche
Provinciale en Stads-Courant,  March . For the petitions, see Dutch National Archive, Archief
van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, – (entry no. ..), inv. nos.  (nos.
, ),  (no. ),  (nos. –, , ),  (nos. –, ) and  (nos. ,
, ).
14 Handelingen der Tweede Kamer,  ( April).
15 Even if some had in fact briefly reduced lending, this would merely strengthen the point made here
that Amsterdam’s market for seafarer loans was substantial.
16 ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos. –. The estates also contain pre-printed IOUs from Dordrecht,
Middelburg, Purmerend and Rotterdam. This suggests that, whilst port size and the sophistication
of local financial markets may have favoured credit markets for seafarers in Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, they also developed in the second- and third-rank Dutch ports. See Handelingen der
Staten-Generaal, –, pp. –; –, p. ; –, p. ; –, p. ; –, p.
; –, p. ; –, p. ; Statistisch Jaarboek der Gemeente Amsterdam II, p.; Jonker .
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one of the large lenders, Cas Spijker, also kept account books and provided receipts
for the goods that seafarers purchased.17 The IOUwas pivotal, however, as it had to be
presented to the water bailiff to collect wage payments and to record repayments on.
Four characteristics of the IOUs deserve mentioning. First, specifications of the
goods and services that were received on credit are usually absent.18 Though the
occupation of the lender is sometimes mentioned on the IOU, it can also be retrieved
from additional sources. This way some insight can still be obtained about the goods
and services involved (see Section IV). Second, loan repayments were contingent on
the ship’s safe journey (behouden reis) and the interest rate was implicit. Lenders added a
premium – ,  and  per cent seem to have been common – to the value of the
goods and services that they provided.19 Third, new loans were not always recorded
on a new IOU. While Cas Spijker did document his  and  loans to Jonas
Aberg on two separate forms, it was not uncommon to add new loans on the
reverse of an IOU after an initial repayment. In one such case, a seafarer’s wife pur-
chased additional goods on credit – including children’s shoes (kinder schoenen) – on
three occasions while her husband was at sea.20 Fourth, full or partial repayments
were recorded on the IOU and signed for by the lender and water bailiff. The
latter also recorded these payments in his account books.21
After a seafarer returned to port his wages were used to repay his lenders.22 When
he had earned enough he repaid his lenders in full, but in many cases lenders received
a partial payment in proportion to the size of their loans. Unredeemed sums were
deferred to a future journey and then took priority over the more recent loans a sea-
farer might have contracted for that new journey. When subsequent payments were
not made or when again they did not suffice, loans eventually ended up in the water
17 ACA, Waterschout, inv. no.  (scans , ).
18 For exceptions, see ACA, Waterschout, inv. no.  (scans , , ).
19 Van Bochove ; ACA, Waterschout, inv.nos.  (scans , , ),  (scans , , ,
, ),  (scan ),  (scans , , , , ) and  (scans , , ). As actual
interest rates depended on seafarers’ repayment schedules they thus differed from one seafarer to
another. Establishing them systematically is impossible, however, because premiums were infre-
quently recorded on IOUs and because the IOUs in seafarers’ estates were hardly ever repaid in
full. See Van Bochove  on interest rates on seafarer loans during the eighteenth century.
20 ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos.  (scans , , , ) and  (scans , , , , ).
21 ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos. –.
22 Acting against the safe journey clause in the IOUs, the water bailiff had resorted to also making repay-
ments from unclaimed estates of deceased seafarers. In these instances the lenders usually guaranteed to
reimburse these sums in case inheritors presented themselves. The debts of Carl Eriksen are a good
example of the practice. During his service Eriksen earned  guilders of which he pocketed 
himself. Adding the proceeds of auctioning his possessions (. guilders) and subtracting a contri-
bution to the benevolent society Zeemanshoop ( guilders), a sum of . guilders remained for
repaying debts totalling . guilders to his four lenders. In situations like this lenders accepted
that this final payment settled the seafarer’s debt. ACA, Waterschout, inv.nos.  (scans –)
and  (scan ). This practice was also common at the Dutch East India Company. See Van
Bochove, Milo and Van Velzen .
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bailiff’s ledger of July . This is, for instance, why prominent lender J. W. van
Recken registered a debt of . guilders that seafarer J. Butter had owed him
since May . The water bailiff’s account books contain evidence of this: on 
May  Butter paid half of the . guilders that he owed Van Recken, leaving
. guilders for later journeys. Additional payments never took place, however,
and Van Recken duly registered the unredeemed amount in the  ledger.
Scribbles in this ledger sometimes refer to these past partial payments as ‘last
payment’ (laast voldaan) and ‘remaining’ (rest).23 The  ledger thus contains a
mix of such old, non-performing loans as well as many recent loans on which
repayments had not yet been made.
Except for the heterogeneous names of borrowers, all information in the water
bailiff’s ledger was entered into a database.24 While the unredeemed amount was
recorded for all but one IOU, the date of the (last repayment on the) loan was
included less meticulously. For a large majority of the IOUs (. per cent) the
date was complete, but a substantial share of the entries (. per cent) did not
contain a day. The phenomenon was driven largely by the IOUs registered by a
few prominent lenders. In the case of W. P. Kohl ( out of  IOUs) days were
often not recorded on his IOUs that survived in the estates of deceased seafarers.
However, H. Lond (, out of , IOUs), J. W. van Recken ( out of 
IOUs) and W. G. Fiege ( out of  IOUs) typically recorded full dates on
their IOUs. In these cases the water bailiff’s clerks were most likely responsible for
not copying the day recorded on the IOUs.25 For an additional . per cent of the
IOUs the year was available, but not the day and month. Only . per cent of the
IOUs could not be assigned to a specific year, but as the temporal analysis below
focuses on the year of the (last repayment on the) loan, this fraction is negligible.
Figure  shows the distribution of the years of the (last repayment on the) loans
registered in the water bailiff ’s ledger. The substantial number of recent years was
driven by loans made in  and  on which no, or only partial, repayments
had been made as well as by first and subsequent repayments on older loans. The dis-
tribution’s relatively long and decreasing tail also shows, however, that repayments
had not recently been made on many other older loans. That numerous (last repay-
ments on) loans were made more than five years before the ledger was put together
suggests that a fair share of the new loans provided each year to seafarers (see below)
performed poorly. It is important to realise, however, that lenders undoubtedly
23 ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos.  (scan ) and  (scans , ).
24 The database will be deposited at DANS (https://easy.dans.knaw.nl).
25 For Kohl, see ACA,Waterschout, inv. nos.  (scans , , , ) and  (scans , , ,
). For Lond, see inv. nos.  (scans , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, ) and  (scans , –, , , , ). For Van Recken (who also spelled his name as
Von Reeken), see inv. nos.  (scans , , , , , ) and  (scans , , , ,
, , , , ). For Fiege, see inv. nos.  (scan ) and  (scan ).
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anticipated on (partial) defaults when choosing their premiums and setting the price–
quality ratio of their goods and services.
Figure  builds on Figure  by showing percentile distributions of the unre-
deemed amounts. A straightforward interpretation of the data is complicated, as
the ledger combined loans on which no repayments had been made with loans
that were partially repaid. The th and th percentiles of each year group are
nevertheless helpful for shedding light on the credit market for seafarers. The
th percentile, for instance, will mainly have consisted of large loans on which
no repayments had been made. The fact that the corresponding values for old as
well as recent loans did not typically exceed  guilders is illustrative. Some
loans were of course larger, but usually not by much: only  of the unredeemed
amounts were for  guilders or more and only two of them exceeded 
guilders (i.e. one for , guilders and one for , guilders). These values
suggest that while IOUs did not usually exceed  guilders, most of them will
have been smaller than  guilders. The th percentile, in turn, gives an impres-
sion of the lower bound of the value of new IOUs because loans below the th
percentile will have consisted disproportionately of partially repaid loans. The
modest U-shaped pattern of the th percentile is consistent with this as it
points to the presence of relatively many fully unredeemed loans among older
(because fewer partially repaid loans would still be included) and more recent
dates (because full and partial repayments had not yet been made). Figure 
hence suggests that new seafarer loans most likely ranged between  and 
Figure . The years of the (last repayment on) loans
Source: Database register waterschout.
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guilders.26 These modest loan sizes notwithstanding, the credit market for seafarers
managed to reach a substantial overall size.
IV
As lenders brought their IOUs to the water bailiff to have them registered in the
ledger, their loans were usually recorded in it on one day and in consecutive series.
There were a few exceptions to this (see Section II), so that in a number of instances
lenders had to be linked in order to derive unique persons. However, because the
lenders constituted a relatively confined group and because the type of credit was
very specific, the risk of falsely linking lenders was small. After completing the
linking procedure,  unique lenders remained. This number in itself suggests that
a sizeable and diverse group of people commonly lent to seafarers and felt safe to
do so.
To shed more light on the background of the most prominent lenders, information
was collected from three additional sources. The IOUs available in the estates of
deceased seafarers were considered first because these most likely belonged to the
lenders actually being scrutinised. The local address book was consulted next as it
Figure . The percentile distribution of the (remaining) loan values by year of the (last repayment on the)
loan (in guilders)
Source: Database register waterschout.
26 These values are consistent with the amounts recorded on  IOUs of one lender, Cas Spijker,
which have survived in the archives and which are discussed in more detail below. Here the th,
th and .th percentiles (cf. the  unredeemed amounts discussed in the text) had values of
., . guilders and . guilders respectively, while the largest IOU amounted to .
guilders.
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was less specific than the IOUs, but still not too general. The address book included
many shopkeepers and thus more likely referred to the lenders under review than
more general sources would. Since the IOUs considered cover the period –,
the – edition of the address book was used. Finally, the – population
register was checked.27 Through these sources information was obtained on name,
address, occupation, goods and services provided on credit, minimum career
period, date of birth and place of origin. Tables  and  present the results for the
largest lenders (i.e. those with a  per cent or larger share in the overall unredeemed
debt) as well as for groups of lenders who did not meet this criterion.28
Table  shows that there existed two groups of lenders: a substantial group whose
involvement was infrequent andmodest as well as a smaller group whose involvement
was frequent and substantial. Some of the latter were no longer alive and others had
retired from lending, as witnessed by the share of (last repayments on) loans registered
for  and , but others were still very active. The more important lenders not
only registered . times as many unredeemed loans on average (. times without
Spijker and Lond), but their unredeemed loans were also  per cent larger on
average. As a result, this group claimed . times larger sums of money on average
(. times without Spijker and Lond). As the largest lenders (. per cent of the
number of lenders) combined for . per cent and . per cent of the registered
number and value of IOUs respectively, Tables  and  give a good insight into
the most important players in this credit market.
From Table  it becomes clear that the largest lenders had the occupations familiar
from the descriptions of sailor-towns: tailors, cobblers, shopkeepers, drink sellers and
boarding-house keepers. They were also situated in those parts of town where
one would expect to find them: the sailor-town in the eastern part of Amsterdam
(i.e. Geldersche Kade, Nieuwmarkt, Zeedijk and Nieuwebrugsteeg) and the shop-
ping district in the western part of Amsterdam (i.e. Nieuwendijk, Kolksteeg and
27 ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos. – (only the pre-printed IOUs were analysed); Amsterdam City
Archive, Collectie Stadsarchief Amsterdam: Adresboeken (entry no. ) (henceforth ACA,
Adresboeken), inv. no. ; Amsterdam City Archive, Archief van het Bevolkingsregister (entry no.
) (henceforth ACA, Bevolkingsregister), inv. nos. – (consulted through https://archief.
amsterdam/indexen/bevolkingsregisters_1851-1853/zoek/index.nl.html). The details of some
addresses were completed through HisGIS Amsterdam, which was linked to the – population
register (www.hisgis.nl/hisgis/gewesten/amsterdam/kaart1860/amsterdam1860).
28 A .% threshold was rejected because it almost halved the retrievable information andmade incorrect
matches more likely. Reconstructing the cases of H. Lond, A. Hensmans and Widow C. J. Caspers
required information from a fourth source: newspaper advertisements. These showed that Hendrik
Lond died in , but that Jan Coenraad Londt married his widow (Wilhelmina Maria
Schweeke) and continued the business under the name ‘H. Lond’. A marriage announcement
revealed that Hensmans was incorrectly included in the digitised population register as
‘Hezemans’; mention of his wife, Dorothea Timmers, in an advertisement established this.
Announcements of a th wedding anniversary and a death showed that C. J. Caspers had been
married to Antje van Ammers, who was in fact included in the population register. See Algemeen
Handelsblad, November ,  June ,  February , November  and April .
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Table . Descriptive statistics of the lenders
Lender Number of IOUs Value (remaining) of IOUs
Name Period N % Σ N N % Σ N % N in – Guilders % Σ Guilders Average
C. Spijker –  .% , .% .% , .% .
J. R. Sachtleben –  .%  .% .% , .% .
H. Lond –  .% , .% .% , .% .
J. H. Timmerman –  .%  .% .% , .% .
C. H. Jansen –  .%  .% .% , .% .
A. Hensmans –  .%  .% .% , .% .
W. P. Kohl –  .%  .% .% , .% .
G. Steenhoff –  .%  .% .% , .% .
J. A. Rijks –  .%  .% .% , .% .
B. J. Kohl –  .%  .% .% , .% .
Widow C. J. Caspers –  .%  .% .% , .% .
G. Pluimker –  .%  .% .% , .% .
J. W. van Recken –  .%  .% .% , .% .
W. G. Fiege –  .%  .% .% , .% .
H. A. Kokenge –  .%  .% .% , .% .
J. H. Sachtleben –  .%  .% .% , .% .
J. Feijs –  .%  .% .% , .% .
O. Christiansen –  .%  .% .% , .% .
N. Feis –  .%  .% .% , .% .
H. C. Petersen –  .%  .% .% , .% .
J. Schrager –  .%  .% .% , .% .
J. H. Klönne –  .%  .% .% , .% .
L. Fopma –  .%  .% .% , .% .
P. C. Pedersen –  .%  .% .% , .% .
A. Dussman –  .%  .% .% , .% .
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.%≤X –  .% , .% .% , .% .
.%≤X< .% –  .% , .% .% , .% .
.%≤X< .% –  .% , .% .% , .% .
% < X< .% –  .% , .% .% , .% .
Overall  .% , .% , .% .
Source: Database register waterschout.
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Table . Information about the major lenders
Name in
population register
Place
of birth Agea Address Occupation
Cas Spijker Amsterdam  Geldersche Kade  Shopkeeper (tobacco)
Johan Rudolph
Sachtleben
Germany  Nieuwmarkt  Shopkeeper/tailor
Jan Coenraad Londt Amsterdam  Zeedijk  Shopkeeper/merchant
Johan Hinrich
Timmermanb
Germany – Nieuwendijk  Tailor
Casparus Hendrikus
Jansen
Amsterdam  Nieuwendijk  Shopkeeper/tailor
Antonius
Hensmans
Amsterdam  Nieuwmarkt  Shopkeeper/tailor
Wilhelm Petrus
Kohl
Amsterdam  Nieuwendijk  Shopkeeper
Gerhard Steenhoff Amsterdam  O.Z. Voorburgwal

Tailor
Johannes Arnoldus
Rijks
Amsterdam  Nieuwendijk  Shopkeeper/tailor
Bernardus Johannes
Kohl
Amsterdam  Zeedijk  Shopkeeper (woollens
and manufactures)
Antje van Ammers Amsterdam  Wijde Kapelsteeg  Boarding-house keeper
Geert Pluimker Germany  Teertuinen  Shopkeeper (clothing
and manufactures)
J. W. van Reckenc Germany – Nieuwmarkt  Clothing
Willem Georg
Fiege
Netherlands  Texelsche Kade  Shopkeeper/tailor
Hendrik Antoon
Kokenge
Germany  Nieuwendijk  Tailor
Johan Hendrik
Sachteleben
Germany  Zeedijk  Shopkeeper/tailor
Johannes Feijs Amsterdam  Haarlemmerdijk  Tailor
Oele Christiaanse Denmark  Geldersche Kade  Drink seller
Nicolaas Feis Netherlands  Nieuwebrugsteeg  Grocer
Hans Christiaan
Petersen
Denmark  Warmoesstraat  Boarding-house keeper
Jacob Schrager Germany  Wijde Kapelsteeg  Boarding-house keeper
Johan Heinrich
Klönne
Germany  Kolksteeg  Tailor
Louw Fopma Netherlands  N. Z. Armsteeg  Boarding-house keeper
Pieter Christiaan
Petersen
Denmark  Wijde Kapelsteeg  Boarding-house keeper
Albert Duszmann Germany  Kapelsteeg  Drink seller
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N.Z. Armsteeg). Boarding-house keepers occupied a rather modest position among
the top lenders. This suggests that they obtained (part of) the two months’ wage
advance that seafarers received when they mustered.
The tables suggest that in  the largest lenders were typically males born in
Amsterdam, who were in their forties or fifties and who had been active as lenders
for several decades. The top  was completed by lenders with more varied back-
grounds. The presence of lenders born elsewhere in the Netherlands as well as
those born in Denmark and Germany stands out and is consistent with what is
known about migration and the Amsterdam labour market. The occupations that
involved providing credit to seafarers were apparently sufficiently open to outsiders
to allow them to become substantial lenders quickly (Van Lottum ; Hell
). Besides lenders of non-Amsterdam origin, the presence of the widow of C.
J. Caspers points to the involvement of another interesting group. While the top
 counted only one widow, the ledger actually contained  others (see above).
At least one of these, the widow of W. Louwes, used a form that also pre-printed
her name. The fact that widows successfully continued to supply loans suggests that
they had already been closely involved in the businesses of their husbands when
they were still alive.29
The size and diversity of the group of lenders raises the question of how they could
be assured that seafarers would not run up debts across town beyond their capacity to
repay. While the water bailiff’s service of making loan repayments from seafarers’
wages solved the moral hazard problem, it did not protect lenders against the
risks of adverse selection. The fact that the credit market for seafarers had existed
for so long, and that so many and diverse lenders participated in it, suggests that a
Notes to Table 2:
a The age of the lenders refers to their age on  July , the last day on which loans were
recorded in the water bailiff’s ledger.
b Algemeen Handelsblad,  April , shows that J. H. Timmerman was no longer alive when
the ledger was compiled.
c Van Recken was born on  November  in Phiesewarden near Blexen, which his
marriage certificate (dated  October ) listed as his place of origin. He died in October
 and his wife continued the ‘renowned’ store until her death in January . Van
Recken’s death is corroborated by the fact that on the reverse of his IOUs it is indicated that
payments were subsequently received by his widow and heirs. See Auswanderer aus dem
Großherzogtum Oldenburg (www.auswanderer-oldenburg.de/getperson.php?personID=I767
58&tree=Auswanderer); WieWasWie (www.wiewaswie.nl/nl/detail/35433099); Algemeen
Handelsblad,  November ,  January ,  February  and March ; ACA,
Waterschout, inv. nos. –. Van Recken’s address was taken from the – address
book. See ACA, Adresboeken, inv. no. .
Source: Table ; notes  and .
29 ACA, Waterschout, inv. no.  (scan ).
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mechanism existed to mitigate adverse selection. Did long-term relationships
between lenders and borrowers perhaps play a role? Or did boarding-house
keepers play an intermediary role by, for instance, lodging their compatriots or
by only referring their guests to specific shopkeepers (Hell )? Current knowl-
edge about how lenders conducted their businesses is unfortunately still insufficient
to answers such questions. Section V therefore takes a first step by reconstructing the
daily operations of one major lender for whom several sources were available in add-
ition to the water bailiff’s ledger.
V
Cas Spijker was the most important lender in the water bailiff’s ledger: numerically he
missed first place by just  loans, but financially he ranked first by far (see Table ).
Spijker was born in Amsterdam on  February  and, according to the population
registers of the period –, he lived at Geldersche Kade  – or  according to
the new house numbering system introduced in  –with his wife, six to eight chil-
dren and one maid. The population register listed Spijker as a shopkeeper (winkelier)
and based on his lending he must have been operating as such since at least . It is
unclear where his shop was located then, but the – edition of a local address
book situated it at Geldersche Kade  (where in the – edition another shop
was still located). In a January  advertisement in Algemeen Handelsblad Spijker
announced the relocation of his shop to Geldersche Kade . In this advertisement
he also mentioned that he ran a business ‘in Tobacco, etc., etc., etc., etc.’. That he
indeed sold more than just tobacco is demonstrated by an IOU from  in
which a ship’s carpenter confirmed that he owed Spijker money for ship’s carpenters’
tools, tobacco, coffee, soap, cigars and other unspecified goods. Despite this wide
variety of goods, the local address books included Spijker as ‘shopkeeper and mer-
chant in tobacco’ (winkelier en koopman in tabak) or simply as ‘in tobacco’ (in tabak).
Spijker thus seems to have operated a general store for seafarers with a focus on
tobacco. Interestingly, Spijker was also responsible for organizing support for unfor-
tunate neighbours as a commissioner of his neighbourhood.30
Besides the ledger, the water bailiff’s archive contains additional sources that shed
light on Spijker’s lending. As the water bailiff was responsible for settling the estates
of deceased seafarers, his archive holds many of the original IOUs presented by
lenders to claim (partial) repayments from the seafarers’ estates. This collection con-
tains, among others,  IOUs from Spijker.31 These IOUs cover the period –
30 Van Wageningen ; ACA, Bevolkingsregister, inv. nos.  (scan ) and  (scan ); ACA,
Waterschout, inv. nos.  (scan ) and  (scan );Gepriviligeerd naamregister der heeren kooplieden,
–, ; –, ;Algemeen adres-boek of naamregister van de notabelste inwoners der stad Amsterdam,
–, ; –, ; –, ; –, ; –, ; –, ; –, ;
Algemeen Handelsblad,  January ,  May ,  February  and  October ; De
Tijd,  December .
31 ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos. –.
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and were all pre-printed.32 The initial form, in use between  and , was fairly
simple. An analysis of the  forms revealed that Spijker then used two types of
form: one on which the rank of sailor was pre-printed and one on which the rank
was left blank. The use of such dedicated forms suggests that lending must already
have been substantial by this time. In the years that followed, Spijker used an even
broader set of dedicated forms. Four forms existed to record combinations of
rank (sailor or blank) and literacy (with a special clause in case of illiteracy).33 At
some stage a pre-printed field for seafarers’ ages was incorporated into the form as
well.
Spijker typically recorded the rank, destination and boarding-house keeper of his
borrowers. The latter might point to relationships between boarding-house keepers
and lenders as a solution to adverse selection problems. However, based solely on
Spijker’s IOUs, it cannot be established decisively whether these relationships were
exclusive and indeed whether they protected lenders sufficiently. Rank and destin-
ation, which were recorded together on  of the  IOUs, are fortunately
easier to interpret. Sailors dominated with  IOUs and were followed by carpenters
(), sailmakers (), cooks (), boatswains (), boatswains’ mates (), junior sailors (),
medical doctors (), ship’s stewards (), a cooper and a helmsman.34 Except for three
seafarers who sailed within Europe, these seafarers sailed on the long-distance routes
to Batavia, capital of the Dutch East Indies (), Surinam (), the Guinea coast ()
and South America ().35 The most common combination of rank and destination
was the sailor going to Batavia (). It is not surprising that this particular group
dominated the IOUs found in the estates settled by the water bailiff. Because of
the long voyage they presumably relied on credit more frequently than seafarers on
other routes. In addition to this, crews on this route were large and numbered
many sailors. With long voyages and the prevalence of tropical diseases, the absolute
number of deceased sailors on this route must have been higher than that on other
routes. It is therefore logical that sailors on the route to Batavia dominated the
estates of deceased seafarers settled by the water bailiff.
The number of annual observations for most rank-destination combinations is too
small to generalise, but the number of sailors going to Batavia is large enough to deter-
mine how borrowing within this particular group developed over time. Figure  sug-
gests that the median loan of these borrowers increased substantially, but continued to
fall within the  to  guilders range of new loans as found above. As Spijker was
born in , the increase points to a process through which he – as a young shop-
keeper – established how much he could lend to particular rank–destination
32 On pre-printed IOUs, see Van Bochove and Kole .
33 The IOUs of illiterate seafarers were typically signed by witnesses. See, for instance, ACA,
Waterschout, inv. no.  (scans , , ). The presence of signatures, whether of seafarers or
their witnesses, probably prevented lenders from counterfeiting IOUs.
34 The seafarers with the unknown destinations were two sailors and a carpenter.
35 There were no clear trends over time in the share of sailors in ranks and Batavia in destinations.
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combinations and an expansion of his (lending) business. The latter tallies well with
the fact that he started recording serial numbers on each of his IOUs in : an indi-
cation that his business administration had indeed grown in the years before and
required more careful monitoring.
The  serial numbers available for the period – can also be exploited to
estimate the annual number of loans provided by Spijker. As the highest serial
Figure . The total number of loans provides by Cas Spijker and the median size of his loans contracted
by sailors going to Batavia (in  guilders)
Note: For the total number of loans series the grey markers indicate that the highest serial
number came fromNovember or December. For the median loan size series the black markers
indicate that ten or more observations were available, the grey markers five to nine and the
white markers fewer than five.
Source: ACA, Waterschout, inv. nos.  (scans , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ),
 (scans , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , ),  (scans , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ),  (scans , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ),  (scans , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , ),  (scans , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ),  (scans , , , , , , ), 
(scans , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ), 
(scans , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , ),  (scans , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ),  (scans ,
, ) and  (scans , , , , , , , , , , , , , , );
‘Value of the guilder’ (www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate.php).
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number often dated from November or December, simple extrapolations were used
to derive the total number of annual loans. These extrapolations set the serial number
on  January at zero and drew a straight line through the latest combination of date and
serial number of each year to derive the number of loans on  December of that
year.36 Figure  shows that the number of loans provided annually by Spijker fell sub-
stantially during the s and this helps explain why he was not among the signator-
ies of the  petition that Amsterdam lenders submitted to parliament (see above).
As borrowers were primarily seafarers on Dutch ships and as the number of Dutch
ships that annually departed from Amsterdam increased (see Section VI), Spijker
may have decided autonomously to reduce his lending or he may have been
pushed out of the market by competitors.
Whilst the available sources do not make it possible to expand on the latter, they do
contain evidence of the former for they suggest that Spijker had gradually specialised
in making cigars instead of selling them to seafarers on credit. This helps explain why
he sought cigar makers for his factory through advertisements in  and  and
why the address books started referring to him as ‘cigar factory owner’ (sigarenfabrikant)
and ‘cigar factory’ (sigarenfabriek) rather than merely ‘in tobacco’.37 Spijker’s change of
business suggests that the profitability of producing cigars was higher than running his
shop and selling to seafarers on credit. As the literature does not typically characterise
the profits of shopkeepers and small factory owners as excessive, this forces us to
rethink the premiums charged to seafarers (see above). In the literature these pre-
miums have long been interpreted as being exploitative and those who charged
them were looked upon with suspicion. The case of Spijker suggests, however,
that premiums were high not to take advantage of a group of vulnerable borrowers
but rather to cover the high costs and risks of lending to seafarers. Such a revision is
even required if Spijker was in fact pushed out of the market by his competitors,
because that would point to competitive markets and more agency and a better
bottom-line for seafarers.38
36 Linear regressions with the serial number as dependent variable, time as independent variable and an
intercept that did not necessarily coincide with  January (cf. the simple extrapolations) were also esti-
mated. They yielded slightly higher results in most years, but much higher results in two years because
of the particular distribution of the serial numbers available for those years. For reasons of consistency
simple extrapolations were therefore preferred. Figure  nevertheless slightly underestimates Spijker’s
lending because new loans were sometimes recorded on the reverse of existing IOUs (i.e. without
using a new serial number). As there is no reason to assume that the proportion of loans recorded
with(out) new serial numbers changed over time, Figure  still provides a good overview of the devel-
opment of Spijker’s lending.
37 Algemeen adresboek der Stad Amsterdam, –, p. ; –, p. ; –, p. ; –, p.
; Algemeen Handelsblad,  February  and  October .
38 The Amsterdam lenders, who may of course have been biased, also emphasised this point when they
petitioned parliament (see above). See Van Bochove and Van Velzen  for similar conclusions
about the premiums charged to employees of the Dutch East India Company.
CREDIT WITHOUT BANKS 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 14 Jul 2020 at 09:44:37, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
VI
Besides shedding light on the business of one specific lender, the Spijker data also
make it possible to gauge the overall size and volume of the market for new seafarer
loans in Amsterdam during the period –. The annual numbers of loans in
Figure  were hence related to Spijker’s share in each year class of the loans that
were still unredeemed in July . This share dropped in an almost straight line
from close to  per cent in  to just over  per cent in  and then gradually
declined further to just under  per cent in . As Spijker’s share in unredeemed
loans must have correlated with his share in newly provided loans, each number of
new loans provided by Spijker (as given in Figure ) was divided by his corresponding
share in unredeemed loans to estimate the total number of new loans provided to sea-
farers by all lenders. To use  as an example,  of the  (last repayments on)
loans registered in the water bailiff’s ledger belonged to Spijker, giving him a share
of . per cent for this particular year. As Figure  set the number of new loans pro-
vided by Spijker in  at , the number of new loans provided by all lenders was
estimated at ,.
The results are presented in Figure  and suggest that the non-bank credit market
raised , to , new loans for seafarers in Amsterdam each year. The reliability of
the estimation procedure is verified by two pieces of information: first, the fact that the
estimates tally well with the order of magnitude documented for the number of (last
repayments on) loans in  (full year) and  (incomplete year) in Figure ;
second, the fact that the increasing number of new loans closely matched the rising
number of Dutch ships that departed from the Amsterdam port. The relationship
between the two is logical: seafarers on foreign ships did not require credit since
they enjoyed board and lodging on their ships while in Amsterdam, but seafarers
on Dutch ships were discharged when they returned to Amsterdam and often
depended on credit to bridge the period until their next departure. Collecting repay-
ments from the water bailiff was only possible, moreover, when a ship returned to the
Netherlands; something that was much more likely to occur with Dutch than with
foreign ships.39
With the size of a new loan ranging between  and  guilders (see above), the size
of the credit market for seafarers ranged between , to , guilders per
39 Only one other lender – whose IOUs overlapped with those of Spijker – often numbered his IOUs,
provided a sufficiently large number of loans and had a market share substantial enough to yield reli-
able outcomes: J. W. van Recken. During the period – Van Recken provided well over one
hundred loans annually, which suggests an overall number of new loans of , IOUs in , ,
in  and , in . Although these numbers are lower than those of Spijker, they developed
similarly and are of the same order of magnitude. This suggests that the procedure applied to Spijker’s
IOUs provides useful results. As Van Recken’s lending dropped substantially in –, perhaps
because of health issues leading up to his fatal stroke in  (see Algemeen Handelsblad, 
November ), estimates of the size of the overall market for these years would be based on
shaky foundations and are therefore not included here.
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annum during the period considered here.40 These were quite substantial sums,
especially if one realises that the credit market for seafarers was just one niche in the
non-bank credit market of a town like Amsterdam. It also raises the question of how
such sums were raised by the lenders, especially since money was sometimes fixed
for several years. Did they finance their loans themselves or did they rely on outside
funding of suppliers or other lenders? The sources in the water bailiff’s archive do
not shed light on this issue, but it would be worthwhile exploring it in future research.
VII
Before the rise of banks, people organised credit themselves or with the help of alter-
native intermediaries. Due to a lack of encompassing sources, however, the size and
functioning of these non-bank credit markets have been notoriously difficult to
Figure . The overall credit market for seafarers (in number of loans) and the number of Dutch ships
departing from Amsterdam
Source: Database register waterschout; Figure ; Van Bochove , n. ;Algemeen Handelsblad, 
August .
40 The only useful non-bank credit data to put these figures in perspective are the loans provided by
Amsterdam’s municipal and licensed pawnshops. Amsterdam City Archive, Archief van de Bank
van Leening (entry no. ), inv. no.  shows that during the period – these institutions
annually combined for . to . million loans or . to . million guilders. More pawn
credit than seafarer credit was thus provided in Amsterdam, but Amsterdam’s population was also
much larger than the number of seafarers who annually departed from its port (see note ). As a
niche of the non-bank credit market, and especially in monetary terms, the credit market for seafarers
was thus relatively substantial.
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analyse systematically. Exceptional sources from the archive of Amsterdam’s water
bailiff allowed this article to overcome this problem. It could hence determine the
size of one particular segment of the non-bank credit market: credit received by sea-
farers in the decades prior to July . Seafarers relied on credit to obtain board and
lodging, shipping gear and other goods. They secured loans by allowing the water
bailiff to make redemption payments from their future wages. An example discussed
in this article even showed that a seafarer’s wife could obtain credit, while her husband
was away, on the basis of his future wages.
Having access to their future wages enabled seafarers in Amsterdam to take out
, to , new loans each year during the period –. These loans were rela-
tively small and did not typically seem to have exceeded  guilders. Many of these
loans were repaid in full, some were partially written off upon a seafarer’s death
and others were not, or only partially, repaid. These loans, together with similar
loans made before  and after , were registered in the water bailiff’s ledger
in July  in accordance with the Discipline Act. The ledger registered ,
IOUs presented by  lenders and representing about , guilders. The great
number of new (–) and (partially) unredeemed IOUs (), the substantial
sums of money, the large and diverse group of lenders, and the wide use of standar-
dised and pre-printed IOUs suggest that the market for seafarer credit was substantial
and well-developed.
Although a core group of shopkeepers and boarding-house keepers dominated
lending, lenders from all walks of life felt safe to enter the credit market for seafarers.
The water bailiff contributed to this, but relationships between lenders and boarding-
house keepers may also have played a role. Lenders protected themselves for sure by
charging double-digit premiums, but this did not imply that profits were excessive.
Premiums were relatively high because lenders had to recoup the costs and risks of
lending. The example of Cas Spijker suggests that mastering the intricacies of the
lending business involved learning: one had to develop an understanding of the
sums that one could safely lend to each rank–route combination. The businesses of
large lenders like Spijker were complex, based on formal contracts, involved careful
recordkeeping and possibly required external funding. This new perspective on
these key players in sailor-town suggests that much may be gained by no longer
depicting this group negatively as crimps. Approaching them and their businesses
more neutrally will undoubtedly improve our understanding of what they were actu-
ally doing in a practical and economic sense.
The new insights of this article also raise questions that go beyond the Dutch
market for seafarer loans. Did municipal officials like the water bailiff help
credit markets in other countries function more smoothly as well? And if the credit
market for seafarers was already this big, how much credit did shopkeepers and alter-
native intermediaries raise in other segments of the non-bank credit market that
involved ordinary people and their daily needs? Future research should try to
further reconstruct that broad base of the non-bank credit pyramid.
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